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... y las siguientes áreas donde actualmente está intentando crear un cambio:



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CANVAS Analytic Department
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SUBJECT: Analysis of the situation in Venezuela, September 2010. (DRAFT)

INTRODUCTION: This analysis tends to cover **Situation (I), Pillars of Support (II) Key Opposition Stakeholders and their allies (III), List of potential issues in the campaign (IV)** in Venezuelan Society in the face of forthcoming parliamentary elections in September 2010, and it is based on Strategic Estimate performed by CANVAS and its Venezuelan partner 2006, series of independent, academic and institute analysis in 2006-2009. as well as opinions from relevant international analysts in January 2010. Its goal is to provide basis for more detailed planning potentially performed by interested performers and CANVAS. The follow up of this analysis will appear in Plan Format later during the process after consultations with stakeholders.

BRIEF ANALYSIS:

Elections in 2010 are perceived as important by majority of Venezuelans. This is the first opportunity for the opposition to get back into a position of power, or at least get the electoral seats (after boycotting last parliamentary elections of 2005) in the legislature. The move essentially handed the government to Chavez, who proceeded to centralize state apparatus under himself, including uniting the disparate left-leaning parties into the Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Since then the government has survived all attempts by the opposition to challenge Chavez's power. This has in part been because Chavez maintained sufficient popularity to gain a majority in recall referenda and elections. The first point of weakness appeared in December 2007 when a constitutional rewrite proposed by Chavez was rejected in a referendum (all or nearly all elements of the proposed amendments were later enacted by the National Assembly without voter approval).

Since then Chavez has continued to score more victories -- including the elimination of term limits on politicians -- however, Chavez has been losing popularity in part due to the decline of the economic situation and growing crime rate and in part because his authoritarian measures have caused skepticism. Nevertheless, the regime is highly offensive in nature with regards to the largely fragmented and strategically divided opposition. The political organizations left over from the fragmented democratic system that controlled the country prior to Chavez form the core of the Venezuelan political opposition, however, their success has been limited by the lack of unity, sound strategy and variety of their individual goals.

As a result of the failures of the entrenched political parties to unite into a strong opposition front to Chavez or offer an alternative political model, non-formal opposition groups to the regime are gaining more support. At this point it is unclear whether they would be capable to influence 2010. election results. The key to the election results therefore, may lie in the question whether the Student Groups and other "non-formal actors" are capable to build their infrastructure and exploit their legitimacy, work on wider coalition among themselves, create and develop sound strategy for the elections with its partners, develop cooperation with prominent opposition leaders in order put a pressure on opposition parties to unite in forthcoming elections, carry on mobilization and "Get out to vote campaign", repeat successful attempt to monitor and report on the results from last referendum, and mobilize people to defend electoral results in the case of election fraud by the regime. Nevertheless, the aggressive patterns of the Chavez administration make it likely that there will be attempts to undermine opposition politicians as much as possible, including the possibility that some of most prominent opposition individuals will be barred from campaigning -- a tactic that has been utilized with efficacy in the past.

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